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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: DOES IT
PROTECT CHILDREN SUFFERING FROM
AIDS?
I. Introduction
The affliction of a child with acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS)' has ramifications that confront the legal community 2 as well
as the medical community.3 First reported in 1981, 4 AIDS has struck
1. AIDS is a condition which destroys an individual's immune system and
leaves him vulnerable to certain infections and cancers. The acronym AIDS stands
for "acquired" to show that it is not hereditary or caused by medication, "immune"
to relate to the body's defense system against disease, "deficiency" to indicate the lack
in cellular immunity, and "syndrome" to show the set of diseases that signal the
diagnosis. NEw YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,. AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME 3 (October 1985) [hereinafter cited as
SPEC4 REPORTI; see Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-
United States, 31 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MoRBmrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 507 (1982), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS PUBLISHED IN MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT JUNE 1981 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1985, at 17 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as REPORTS ON AIDS]. AIDS is also known as acquired im-
munodeficiency syndrome. See L. MAss, MEDICAL ANSWERS ABOUT AIDS I (1985)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL ANSWERS]. For a more extensive discussion of AIDS
see infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text.
2. For instance, the screening for AIDS raises a host of privacy issues. See,
e.g., Carroll, State Permits Closing of Bathhouses to Cut AIDS, N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1985, at 1, col. 4 (closing of bathhouse); Boffey, Military Services Will Be
Screened for AIDS Evidence, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 1, col. I (military
screening); Barron, Insurers Study Screening for AIDS, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1985,
at B12, col. 4 (insurance screening). See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legal issues raised by the admittance of AIDS-afflicted
children into school. See generally Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON
L. REV. 717, 726-37 (1984); Shipp, Concern Over Spread of AIDS Generates a
Spate of New Laws Nationwide, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1985, at 30, col. 1; cf.
O'Boyle, More Firms Require Employee Drug Tests: Legal Questions Surround
Spread of Mandatory Screening, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (employer-
employee screening).
3. See infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text.
4. In June, 1981, the Federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) first reported
the occurrence in five homosexual men of pneumocystis carinii pnuemonia, a disease
that later was attributed to AIDS. See Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250 (1981),
reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 1. A month later, the CDC
reported that Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS) had been diagnosed in twenty-six homosexual
men within the prior two and a half years. See Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis
Among Homosexual Men-New York City and California, 30 CENTER FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 305 (1981), reprinted in REPORTS
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over 15,000 victims to date,5 more than 200 of whom are children.6
Although much of the legal controversy has focused on whether
AIDS-afflicted school children should be permitted to attend school,
an equally important secondary issue is whether their identities should
be disclosed to school personnel and the community at large.
Although these issues currently affect only a handful of school
districts,' they have unleashed an unprecedented emotional reaction
among parents who fear that AIDS could spread throughout the
school system.' While advocating that the identities of these children
be disclosed to the entire community, many parents claim that, at
the very least, disclosure should be made to school personnel.
They contend that such disclosure would ensure better medical pro-
tection for healthy children as well as AIDS-infected children. 9 Public
disclosure, however, could have severe repercussions for the children,
including ostracism by both classmates and teachers.' 0
This Note will examine the constitutional right of privacy of
children with AIDS. First, it will discuss the history and current
status of the right to nondisclosure of personal information." The
Note then will analyze constitutional protections enjoyed by chil-
dren," specifically the extent of their right to confidentiality. 3 It
ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 2. KS is a rare cancer infecting the lining of blood
vessel, and it frequently afflicts AIDS victims. See Laurence, The Immune System
in AIDS, Sci. AM., Dec. 1985, at 84 [hereinafter cited as Laurence].
The Federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) is a federal health agency, a sub-
division of the Public Health Service, that is located in Atlanta, Georgia and "charged
with protecting the public health of the Nation by providing leadership and direction
in the prevention and control of diseases and other preventable conditions and respond-
ing to public health emergencies." THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANuAL 1985-86
276 (1985).
5. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
9. See Perlez, 6 AIDS Children to Attend Schools, City Officials Say, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at BI, col. 5; see also Petitioners' Post-Hearing Brief at 48-56,
District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d
325 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Petitioners]; infra
notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
10. See Respondents' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at 61-68, District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Respondents]; Post-
Trial Brief of Respondent-Intervenor John or Jane Doe at 50-60, District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Respondent-Intervenor];
see also infra notes 220, 242, 249-50, 269 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 18-142 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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will then discuss the medical and social effects of AIDS. 4 This Note
will determine that states must protect the constitutional right of
confidentiality by limiting disclosure of their condition to medical
personnel within the school system.' 5 Since public policy interests
supporting even limited disclosure to school administrators and teach-
ers do not outweigh children's constitutional right of informational
privacy, 6 this Note will conclude that any disclosure other than to
school health officials would be constitutionally impermissible.' 7
!1. Privacy Encompasses the Right of Confidentiality
In its legal context, the right of privacy involves two different
interests.'8 The first is the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters."' 19 The other is "independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions." ' 20 This Note concerns the former
interest, the right of an individual to control the disclosure of personal
medical information.
The government can abridge this informational privacy right in
one of two ways: either by the initial collection and storage of
private information or by the dissemination of that information to
14. See infra notes 190-225 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 226-62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 248-62 and accompanying text.
18. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-601 (1977).
19. Id. at 599. One commentator describes this interest as "the claim of in-
dividuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others." A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WESTIN]; see also Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) ("privacy ... is control over knowledge
about oneself") [hereinafter cited as Fried); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977) (privacy is "autonomy or control over the
intimacies of personal identity"); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 34, 35-36 (1967) ("privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance
with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited") (em-
phasis omitted).
20. Whalen, 429 U.S. at599-600. One commentator terms this facet of privacy
as the autonomy interest. See Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure,
in PRIVACY, NoMos XIII, at 56 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971). Violation
of autonomy is "conduct by which one person Y restricts the power of another
person X to determine for himself whether or not he will perform an act A or
undergo an experience E .... ." Id.
The Supreme Court has more zealously safeguarded autonomous actions in areas
in which the decision to engage in such actions implicates fundamental rights. See,
e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (con-
traceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (child-rearing and education).
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the public or other entities.2 The danger of unchecked or inadver-
tent disclosure by the government to third parties poses the greater
and more tangible harm to privacy,22 and, thus, it is the focus of
most informational privacy claims.2"
The function of informational privacy is to preserve one's sense
of individualism and identity.2 4 It is viewed also as a necessary
foundation for the formation of respect, love, friendship, and trust
in human relationships." In addition, by permitting conditions to
21. See Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAO. 7, 8 (1976) (cited in Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTTuTONAL LAW
§§ 15-17, at 966 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRI ]; Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12
GONZAGA L. REV. 587, 612-13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon].
22. See Bazelon, supra note 21, at 611-14.
23. As one commentator noted, "an absolute right to privacy against the collection
of personal information would severely restrict government." Bazelon, supra note
21, at 613. In Whalen, the Supreme Court decided that statutory reporting re-
quirements of persons with prescriptions for dangerous drugs could not be "mean-
ingfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that
are associated with many facets of health care." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. Examples
of such invasions include medical disclosure requirements relating to venereal disease,
child abuse, fetal death, and injuries caused by a deadly weapon. See id. at 602
n.29. The Court concluded that "[riequiring such disclosures to representatives of
the State having responsibility for the health of the community, does not auto-
matically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy." Id. at 602.
Although the Court noted that it upheld the recordkeeping requirements of a
state abortion law in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), this
disclosure requirement is distinguishable from other informational privacy cases in
that it was evaluated in terms of its effect on a woman's decision to have an
abortion, not in terms of an informational privacy interest. See id. at 79-81. But
see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1975) (Supreme Court reaffirmed principle
that "compelled disclosure [of information to the government], in itself, can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment").
24. One author lists four ways in which informational privacy is essential to
an individual: (1) it protects personal autonomy that is "vital to the development
of individuality and consciousness of individual choice in life"; (2) it promotes
emotional release from the pressures of daily life, especially at times of loss, shock
and sorrow; (3) it allows self-evaluation, including exercise of conscience; and (4)
it permits limited and protected communications which, in turn, provide the in-
dividual with opportuni es for shared experiences and intimacies while maintaining
a sufficient mental distance in interpersonal relationships. WESTIN, supra note 19,
at 34-38; see, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 21, at 589-91; Project, Government In-
formation and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1227-30 (1975).
25. "To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard ourselves
as the objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart of our notion of ourselves
as persons among persons, and privacy is the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes
and actions, as oxygen is for combustion." Fried, supra note 19, at 477-78. In some
situations, however, the right to privacy may be used as a pretext to conceal,
manipulate, defraud or otherwise deprive another of the opportunity to make an
informed judgment. See Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations,
12 GA. L. REV. 455, 466-74 (1978); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1979).
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exist that promote an individual's self-development, privacy serves
an important role in a democratic society-it "fosters the growth
of autonomous, free-thinking individuals necessary for self-govern-
ment. "216
A. Historical Development of the Constitutional Right of
Privacy
In 1890, the concept of a legal right to privacy was first articulated
as the "right to be let alone. ' 27 This notion was premised on the
argument that the common law protected individual privacy from
emerging threats of business and industry. 2 This unprecedented con-
cept led to the development of a right of privacy under tort law.29
A constitutionally-based privacy right developed from explicit con-
stitutional protections involving search and seizure, probable cause,
and self-incrimination. 0 Specifically, the third3' and fourth 2 amend-
ments provided legal protection against the invasion of physical pri-
vacy. In 1886, the Supreme Court widened this privacy interest by
holding that the fourth and fifth" amendments guarantee a right
of private property.34 The Court held that governmental intrusions
26. Bazelon, supra note 21, at 592; see WESTIN, supra note 19, at 34; Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980).
27. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890)
[hereinafter cited as Warren & Brandeis]. This phrase was borrowed from Judge
Thomas Cooley in his treatise of torts: "[t]he right to one's person may be said
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1888). Cooley's treatise was published two years before
the Warren & Brandeis article. See Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 193-95.
28. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27, at 195-98. "The common law secures
to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others." Id. at 198.
29. See generally Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 326, 328 (1966).
30. See Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 177 [hereinafter cited as Posner].
31. The third amendment to the Constitution provides: "No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor
in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend.
Ill.
32. The fourth amendment to the Constitution guarantees: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides in part: "No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
34. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (Court struck down customs
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on the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life"" implicate
constitutional rights of liberty and security.16
Not until Olmstead v. United States 7 did the Court interpret the
underlying policy objectives of the amendments. The issue addressed
in Olmstead was whether the fourth amendment safeguarded against
nontrespassory governmental intrusions by means of wiretap.3" The
result depended on the Court's interpretation of a constitutionally-
based privacy interest.39 If the fourth amendment protected only
physical privacy, then the wiretapping would not invade a constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest. But if the fourth amendment pro-
tected privacy in terms of confidentiality, the wiretapping would be
unconstitutional."0 Although the majority strictly construed the
language of the amendment to deny an expansive reading of privacy,
holding that it protected only physical privacy,"' Justice Brandeis'
forceful dissent has prevailed as the precursor to the development of
a constitutional right of privacy." Brandeis broadened the view of
privacy beyond seclusion and secrecy, declaring it to be a general right
to be free from governmental interference. 3
statute requiring accused to choose between producing his business papers in court
after seizure of his goods or forfeiting those goods as contraband). The Supreme
Court, however, has subsequently discredited the view in Boyd that the fifth
amendment is a basis for privacy rights. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 401 (1976).
35. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
36. "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the [government's] offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,
... which underlies and constitutes [it]." Id.
37. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
38. See id. at 456-57.
39. See Posner, supra note 30, at 177.
40. See id. at 177-78.
41. Liberal construction "can not justify enlargement of the language employed
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or
so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight." Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 465.
42. See Posner, supra note 30, at 181. Posner thought this dissent especially signifi-
cant in that it articulated the existence of a constitutional right of privacy without
citing express support from the Constitution. See id. at 181-82.
43. The founding fathers "conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Brandeis' expansive view of the constitutional right to privacy has never
been fully accepted by the Supreme Court. See D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as O'BRIEN].
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In 1967, the Supreme Court overruled the Olmstead decision and
expanded the concept of privacy to include a component of a
confidentiality interest." While contending that its holding "cannot
be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,' "45 the
Court, nevertheless, declared that the "Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places . . .what [a person] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.""
Just two years earlier, Griswold v. Connecticut4 7 had marked the
arrival of a different constitutional right of privacy. In striking down
Connecticut's contraceptive statute, the Court 'proposed a "pen-
umbra" theory 48 which established constitutional underpinnings to
support an individual's privacy right. Noting that the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments protected privacy, Justice Douglas
maintained that the Bill of Rights protected an individual's privacy
interests as "penumbras" or "emanations" of express constitutional
guarantees. 49 In his concurrence, Justice Goldberg relied on the ninth
amendment, 0 arguing that it guaranteed the existence of certain
fundamental rights not expressly enumerated in the first eight amend-
ments."
44. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Katz involved the
wiretapping of a public telephone booth. See id. at 348. The Court did not define
the nature of the privacy interest. See id. at 350-51. Rather, it focused on whether
a telephone booth was within its scope and whether the tapping was unreasonable
under the given facts. See id. at 351-59; see also Posner, supra note 30, at 186.
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
46. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). For further discussion of the roles of the
fourth and fifth amendments in the protection of privacy, see O'BRIEN, supra note
43, at 35-88; Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Pri-
vacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1977).
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. "[Floregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." id.
50. The ninth amendment to the Constitution states: "[The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
51. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
contended that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, guaranteeing
that a person will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, protected basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at
500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)); see U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. Also finding the right of privacy in
the fourteenth amendment, Justice White invalidated the statute since it did not
prove "reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial
state interest." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (White, J., concurring). For a discussion
of the different views, see Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter
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Shortly thereafter, in Roe v. Wade,52 the Supreme Court revised
its theory, and declared that the right of privacy was a liberty
interest53 protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.54 Using this rationale, the Court invalidated an abortion
statute."
for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 197 (1965); Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219 (1965).
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. The Court stated that the guarantee of personal privacy included only those
rights deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Roe,
410 U.S. at 152-53. Fundamental rights may encompass activities relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, childrearing, and education. See
id. They must be balanced against state interests to determine whether any abridge-
ment by the state is justified. See id. at 153-54. Here, the state interests were: (i)
to discourage illicit sexual conduct; (2) to protect the pregnant woman from a
hazardous medical procedure; and (3) to protect prenatal life. See id. at 147-52.
Only a compelling state interest will justify the infringement of a fundamental
right. See id. at 155. In Roe, the Court balanced the state interests in protecting
maternal health and potential life against the mother's right to privacy. See id. at
159-64.
In a recent abortion decision, Chief Justice Burger, who voted with the majority
in Roe, questioned the soundness of that decision and stated that the Court should
re-examine it. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2192 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment states in part: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). In holding that
the right of privacy is a liberty protected against state infringement by the fourteenth
amendment, the Court adopted a substantive due process approach. See Roe, 410
U.S. at 153; see also id. at 167-71 (Stewart, J., concurring). This approach uses
the due process clause to invalidate federal and state legislation based on their
substance as opposed to their procedures. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages in public school
unconstitutionally restricts liberty of parents to have their children learn foreign
languages).
Justice Douglas' reluctance to embrace substantive due process in Griswold may
have stemmed from the Court's repudiation of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), which invalidated economic and social welfare legislation on a substantive
due process liberty of contract theory. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58 with
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82, 484-85.
The reaffirmation of substantive due process has stirred much debate and con-
troversy. See generally Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH.
L. REV. 219, 222-27 (1965) (substantive due process issue raises host of controversial
questions respecting the relation of law and morals); Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut:
The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law", 42 NOTRE DAME LAW.
680, 689 (1967) (Justice White's view of due process clause subject to challenge).
55. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986), the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy does not extend to
homosexual sodomy. Flatly refuting the view that its previous privacy cases supported
the "proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults
is constitutionally insulated from state proscription," id. at 2844, the Court found
"[nlo connection between family, marriage, or procreation ... and homosexual
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B. Supreme Court Decisions on the Right of Informational
Privacy
To date, the Supreme Court has provided no definitive statement
about the status of a constitutional right of informational privacy.
In Paul v. Davis,56 it first considered the right of confidentiality
and limited its application. The majority rejected the contention that
the publication of flyers that announced to local merchants that
respondent had been arrested for shoplifting violated his constitu-
tional right of privacy." Holding that protection against public
disclosure of the arrest was not within the scope of the right of
privacy, the Court restricted the right of informational privacy to
those areas involving constitutionally protected fundamental rights.,,
In other words, the Court refused to equate a claim against the
publication of information in an official police record with a violation
of an autonomy interest of privacy.5 9 The Court, however, never
explicitly differentiated between autonomy and nondisclosure. Its
language spoke only of a general right of privacy. 60
In Whalen v. Roe,61 the Court attempted to remedy this problem
by recognizing a right of informational privacy. Whalen addressed
the question of whether a state's statute that required record-
ing the names of persons using certain prescription drugs violated
constitutional privacy rights. 62 Acknowledging that the dual protec-
activity ... ." Id. In an angry dissent Justice Blackmun claimed that the "essential
'liberty' that animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Carey surely embrace[ld the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct
that others [might) consider offensive or immoral." Id. at 2858 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
56. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
57. See id. at 712-14. The respondent's name and photograph appeared on the
flyer which was captioned "Active Shoplifters" after his arrest on a shoplifting
charge. See id. at 695. At the time of circulation, the respondent's guilt or innocence
had not been resolved; in fact, shortly thereafter, the charges were dismissed. See
id. at 696. Respondent brought an action under § 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979), alleging violation of his constitutional rights.
See id. at 696-97. In addition to the privacy claim, respondent brought a fourteenth
amendment claim alleging that the police dissemination had deprived him of liberty
without due process of law. See id. at 697.
58. See id. at 713. In subsequent cases, the Court abandoned the fundamental
rights requirement. See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
60. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 712-14. Commentators have criticized the Court for
its failure to distinguish between these separate and independent privacy interests.
See Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1974).
61. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
62. See id. at 591. The Court determined that the state had a legitimate purpose
for its law requiring the recording of patient-identification information before it
19861
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tions of privacy involve rights of autonomy and confidentiality, 63
the Court elevated the "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters"' 64 to a constitutionally protected right. 65 In doing so, the
Court discussed the development and the parameters of an infor-
mational privacy right.66 It then carefully reviewed the statutory
safeguards employed to prevent dissemination of protected infor-
mation to the public. 67
The Court, however, did not identify the constitutional provisions
supporting its recognition of this right. 68 Nor did it articulate a test
to balance an individual's privacy rights against the interests of the
state. 69 Instead, the Court's analysis focused on the provisions in
the statute designed to prevent public dissemination of the infor-
mation. 70 Furthermore, in its conclusion, the Court cast doubt on
addressed the individual's privacy claims. See id. at 597-98. Such a law could assist
in the "ls]tate's vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs."
Id. at 598.
63. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The contested statute threat-
ened to impair both privacy interests. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600. Appellees
argued that the statute created a "genuine concern" among users of the prescribed
drugs that the information would be publicized and hurt their reputations. See id.
In addition to the disclosure interest, this concern would make patients reluctant
to use, and doctors reluctant to prescribe drugs. See id.
64. Id. at 599.
65. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. The Court concluded, how-
ever, that the statute, itself, did not establish a constitutional violation. See Whalen,
429 U.S. at 600-04.
66. See id. at 598-600; see also infra notes 121-22.
67. See id. at 600-02.
68. As support, the opinion cited an article that delineated the different aspects
of a constitutional right to privacy. See Kurland, The Private 1, U. Cri. MAC. 7
(1976) (cited in Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24). For precedential support, the Court
also cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (several provisions of Bill
of Rights create zones of privacy), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first
amendment protects right to read and observe what one chooses in privacy of
one's home), Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (privacy right
encompasses right to be free of governmental intrusion), California Bankers Ass'n
v. Schulz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 (Powell, J., concurring) (governmental intrusion upon
financial transactions could implicate legitimate expectation of privacy), and Cal-
ifornia Bankers, 416 U.S. at 79 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same). See Whalen, 429
U.S. at 599 n.25.
69. But see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
70. The Court discussed three possible means of public disclosure: (1) health
department employees may fail to maintain proper security; (2) the stored data
may be offered in evidence in a judicial proceeding against a patient or doctor
accused of a violation; and (3) a doctor, pharmacist, or patient may reveal this
information on a prescription form. Since the third means already existed under
prior law, the Court focused on the other two means, deeming them conjectures,
unsupported by the record, and unable to mount facial attack on the statute. See
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-02; see also supra note 23.
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whether informational privacy was a constitutional right." In "[a]
final word about issues we have not decided,"" the Court seemingly
undermined its prior holding by declaring that the government's duty
to avoid disclosure of personal information "in some circumstances
... arguably has its roots in the Constitution.""
Nevertheless, later in the same term, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its recognition of a right to nondisclosure of private information in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services." In Nixon, the former
President claimed that his constitutional privacy right was violated
by a Congressional Act that authorized the General Services Ad-
ministrator to take custody of his papers and tapes for subsequent
screening by government archivists." Citing Whalen, the Court de-
fined the informational aspect of privacy as "the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 76 After recognizing this
privacy interest, the Court explicitly employed a balancing test that
weighed the statute's possible intrusion into privacy against both the
statutory purpose and the public interest.7 7 This balancing test was,
in fact, similar to the analysis applied in Whalen."8 In both situa-
tions, the Court weighed the scope of the intrusion against the in-
terests that the intrusion advanced.79
C. Conflict Among the Circuits
In both Whalen and Nixon, the Court evaluated legislation that
infringed on an individual's privacy by authorizing the disclosure
71. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
72. Id.
73. Id. The Court claimed that it had decided no constitutional questions
concerning the disclosure of private information stored in government computer
banks. See id. at 605-06. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan de-emphasized this
disclaimer by reiterating the Court's earlier recognition of a privacy right. See id.
at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring). He further noted that state dissemination of
private information would "clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights,
and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests." Id. at 606
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, however, contested this interpretation,
stating that there is no "general constitutional 'right to privacy.' " Id. at 607-08.
(Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)).
74. 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
75. See id. at 429.
76. Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
77. See id. at 458. As in Whalen, the Court deemed the privacy claim legitimate,
but concluded that the feared intrusion was minimal and, therefore, did not outweigh
the greater public interest of preserving and making available historical documents.
See id. at 458-59, 467-68.
78. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-05.
79. See supra notes 70, 77 and accompanying text.
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of personal information to the government.' 0 The Court determined,
under both sets of facts, that the risk of public disclosure was slight
and that this risk could not offset a more important state purpose.8"
In contrast, in Paul v. Davis, the Court ruled on the constitutionality
of the public dissemination of personal information by the
government 2 and refused to recognize a right of informational pri-
vacy unless the dissemination implicated protected fundamental rights. 3
When confronted with a case involving either collection and storage
of private information or dissemination of the information to the
public,' 4 lower courts have employed different tests and criteria in
their determinations, emphasizing different Supreme Court decisions.
The use of these varied approaches has led to entirely inconsistent
results.' Lower courts disagree about: (1) whether the Supreme Court
has recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy; (2)
what test, if any, should be used to weigh the competing interests;
and (3) what information should be deemed personal.' 6
1. Informational Privacy Not Recognized as a Constitutional
Right
In J.P. v. DeSanti, 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit emphatically rejected the contention that informational
privacy interests implicate constitutionally protected guarantees."s The
case arose when a class of juveniles sought to enjoin the compilation
and dissemination of their social histories.8 9 Finding their privacy
80. See supra notes 62, 75 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 70, 77 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of these types
of infringement.
85. See infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
86. See id.
87. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
88. See id. at 1090. But see In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 641 (6th Cir.) (court
assumes "arguendo" existence of constitutional right of informational privacy),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
89. See id. at 1081. The class encompassed juveniles who previously appeared
or were scheduled to appear before a juvenile court on complaints of delinquency,
unruliness, neglect, dependency, and abuse. See id. Social histories contain material
from many sources, including the complaining parties, the juveniles, their parents,
their school records, and their past court records. See id. at 1082. Written consent
of juveniles or their parents is unnecessary for release of these social histories. See
id. Only a juvenile's lawyer has access to these histories. See id. After the conclusion
of a case, the histories are stored on file at the juvenile court and are available
to fifty-five government, social and religious agencies that are part of a social ser-
vices clearinghouse. See id.
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interest "indistinguishable" from that in Paul," the Desanti court
concluded that there was no "indication in any of [the Supreme
Court's prior] decisions of a constitutional right to nondisclosure
of juvenile court records." 91 Specifically limiting the precedential
value of Whalen92 and Nixon,93 the court refuted the notion that
these decisions overruled Paul.94 The Sixth Circuit criticized the
recognition of an informational privacy right by other circuits, 95 and
cited the decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits as beingin
accord with its holding. 6
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has neither rejected nor embraced
the idea of a constitutional right to informational privacy. In McElrath
v. Califano,91 appellant contested federal and state regulations re-
quiring the disclosure of social security numbers of appellant and,
her family as a prerequisite to welfare assistance. 9 Characterizing
the receipt of welfare payments as a nonfundamental right, 99 the
court refused to raise the disclosure requirement to constitutional
scrutiny.' °° The court thus avoided the issue of informational pri-
90. Id. at 1088. Juvenile court proceedings, however, are functionally very
different from adult criminal proceedings. The juvenile court system recognizes a
child's incapacity and aims to protect the delinquent child from the harshness of
adult proceedings. See infra note 163.
91. Id. at 1088.
92. The Court focused on the concluding' disclaimers in the Whalen decision,
see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text, its lack of precedential support, see
supra note 68 and accompanying text, and Justice Stewart's concurrence. See supra
note 73.
93. The DeSanti court narrowly interpreted the scope of the privacy interest
recognized in Nixon by claiming that the reference to Whalen was for the "apparent
purpose of establishing that Mr. Nixon had an expectation of privacy in his papers
that entitled him to fourth amendment protection." DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1089.
Holding that Whalen did not overrule Paul to create a constitutional right of
confidentiality, see id. at 1088-89, the DeSanti court cited Justice Stewart's con-
currence in Whalen to prove that the Supreme Court did not establish a "general
right to nondisclosure of private information." Id.; see supra note 73.
94. See DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1089.
95. The court claimed that "none cite[d] a constitutional provision in support
of its holding." Id. at 1090.96. See id.; see also infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. In its conclusion,
however, the DeSanti court did acknowledge the importance of a right to privacy
and implied that some aspects of informational privacy may warrant constitutional
protection. See DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1090. However, the court asserted that in the
case at bar, the protection of privacy interests must "be left to the states or the
legislative process." Id. at 1091.
97. 615 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1980).
98. See id. at 435-36.
99. See id. at 441. The right of privacy "embodie[s] only those personal rights
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vacy.' 0
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has refused to take a firm position.
In St. Michael's Convalescent Hospital v. California,02 the court
rejected a privacy claim by health care providers that a statute
mandating the public release of information concerning the costs of
a medical reimbursement program violated their informational pri-
vacy right.' °3 Comparing this claim to that in Paul,'4 the court
concluded that since the disclosure did not " 'restrict freedom of
action in a sphere contended to be private' ... no cognizable
constitutional right of privacy is implicated ... ,
2. Recognition of a Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy
In sharp contrast to the Sixth Circuit, both the Third and the
Fifth Circuits have accepted a constitutional right of informational
privacy. In Plante v. Gonzales,1°6 the Fifth Circuit interpreted Whalen
as recognizing a constitutionally protected right of informational
privacy. 07 Plante involved a claim by five state senators that financial
disclosure provisions in a state statute violated their right of con-
fidentiality. 08 In analyzing the claim, the court rejected both the
"strict scrutiny" and "mere rationality" tests for determining the
101. See generally Note, Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information,
77 Nw. U.L. REv. 536, 548 (1982). In a more recent case, however, the Seventh
Circuit seemingly recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy. See
Kimberlin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1986). After
quoting from the Whalen opinion and citing Justice Brennan's concurrence, the
court held that a privacy interest in information "depends upon whether [the
plaintiff] has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information." Id. at 438,
102. 643 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1981).
103. See id. at 1371-72.
104. See id. at 1375; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 1375 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). However,
in a footnote, the court employed the balancing test implemented in Whalen and
Nixon in case "it could be said that a privacy interest is infringed upon ......
Id. at 1375 n.3; see United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 182 (9th Cir.) (gov-
ernmental surveillance of mail does not invade any constitutionally protected zone
of privacy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp.
202, 208-10 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (disclosure of personal information is recognized as
derivative right and violates Constitution only when it infringes on exercise of
an independently secured constitutional right). For a recent case, see Thorne v.
City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468-70 (9th Cir. 1983) (police department violated
constitutional right of informational privacy of job applicant by requiring her to
reveal information regarding her personal sexual activities in "unbounded, stand-
ardless" polygraph examination), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984).
106. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
107. See Plante, 575 F.2d at 1133.
108. See id. at 1121-22.
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constitutionality of the statute.10° Rather, it embraced a balancing
test similar to that delineated in Whalen and Nixon: "the consti-
tutionality of the [contested Act) will be determined by comparing
the interests it serves with those it hinders.""10
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,"' the Third
Circuit also relied on Whalen in recognizing a constitutional right
of nondisclosure. In that case, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health brought an action to enforce an administrative
subpoena directing Westinghouse to produce certain medical records
of its employees. Westinghouse contended that the disclosure re-
quirement violated its employees' constitutional privacy rights."2 In
analyzing the claim, the court first held that medical records con-
stituted a privacy interest." 3 It then applied an extensive balancing
test to weigh the government's interest in obtaining the information
against the implicated privacy interest.1 4 In deciding that the gov-
ernment's interest in investigating and verifying a health hazard
outweighed the employee's privacy interest in the records, "' the court
considered: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it
possibly contained; (3) the potential for harm in subsequent non-
consensual disclosure; (4) the potential injury from disclosure to the
relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of
109. See id. at 1134. Although the strict scrutiny test is used for privacy cases
involving the right of autonomy, it is an inappropriate test for cases involving the
issue of informational privacy as the "Supreme Court has warned against giving
heightened attention to cases involving new 'fundamental interests.' " Id. at 1134
(citation omitted). Application of the strict scrutiny test would pose potential
problems for many common forms of regulation such as federal income tax, social
security, and securities and exchange acts. See id. at 1134 n.24.
However, the mere rationality standard cannot adequately preserve an individual's
privacy right. See id. at 1134. "[Slcrutiny is necessary .... Otherwise, public
disclosure requirements ... could be extended to anyone, in any situation." Id.
(footnote omitted); see infra notes 140-41 for a more detailed discussion on the
strict scrutiny and mere rationality standards of judicial review.
110. Id. The court then determined that the state's interests served by disclosure
outweighed the senators' interest in avoiding disclosure. See id. at 1137; see also
Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1982) (state's release of subpoenaed
testimony containing confidential and privileged information invaded individual's
privacy right and, therefore, must be balanced against any proper state interest);
Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (state interest
in requiring disclosure of personal finances of federal judges balanced against
privacy right of judges), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
111. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
112. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 572-73.
113. The court concluded that medical records are "well within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy protection." Id. at 577.
114. See id. at 577-78.
115. See id. at 580.
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safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosures; (6) the degree of
need for access; and (7) the existence of an express statutory policy
or any other recognizable public interest for access. ' 6
D. The Status of a Constitutional Right to Informational
Privacy
The Third and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of Whalen and their
application of the Nixon balancing test are consistent with the most
recent holdings and dicta of the Supreme Court on informational
privacy. In addition, their interpretation of Whalen and Nixon as
expanding the privacy right to include an informational component
is better reasoned than the varying approaches taken by the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits." 7
As Professor Tribe has argued, the Whalen Court would not have
evaluated the statute's procedural safeguards against public dissem-
ination so extensively' 8 if it had intended to limit the informational
privacy right to the holding in Paul.19 In addition, the holding in
Whalen should be construed from the opinion in its entirety, not
from its ambiguous concluding remarks.'12 When reviewing the pri-
vacy claim, the Whalen Court extensively traced the nature of privacy
116. See id. at 578.
117. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text; see also Taylor v. Best, 746
F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (public interest in assuring security of prisons and
effective 'rehabilitation must be weighed against prisoner's privacy right in family
history), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 388 (1985); Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631,
635 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that district court improperly applied Paul to privacy
claim and, remanded to evaluate claim in light of Whalen); Tavoulareas v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (district court's order to
-unseal corporation's deposition transcript containing confidential commercial in-
formation violates privacy right in absence of overriding reason to disclose); Barry
v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558-61 (2d Cir.) (privacy interest implicated
in financial disclosure law weighed against governmental purpose of deterring con-
flicts of interest among city official and employees), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017
(1983).
118. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
119. See TRIBE, supra note 21, at 971-72. In Professor Tribe's view, Paul is a
"case about federalism-based limits on the remedial powers of a federal court
acting under § 1983 rather than as a repudiation of deep substantive principles
under the fourteenth amendment . .. ." Id. at 971-72 (footnotes omitted). Tribe
contends that the motivation of the Paul Court was to prevent "the unthinkable
consequence of federalizing the entire state law of torts whenever government
officers are the wrongdoers." Id. at 970 (footnote omitted). As support, Tribe
noted the Court's validation of state rights in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), and the abstention doctrine as set forth in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971). See id. at 971; accord Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979).
120. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
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rights '2 and cited, with approval, an article analyzing the different
facets of privacy rights.'22 The Court then carefully weighed the
interests of the states against the likelihood of public dissemination.'23
If the Court had not recognized a constitutional confidentiality right,
this entire discussion would have been pointless.' 24
Limited to its facts, however, the Paul holding, that disclosure
of information contained in the public record does not implicate a
constitutionally protected privacy interest, retains precedential value.'
Moreover, not all "personal information" merits constitutional pro-
tection. Stating that "in some circumstances that duty [to avoid
unwarranted disclosure] arguably has its roots in the Constitution,"2 6
the Whalen Court suggested that this duty is not absolute.' 27 Hence,
the question is not whether the Constitution safeguards some com-
ponent of informational privacy. Rather, the inquiry is first, what
categories of information are protected,'2 and second, under what
circumstances does disclosure of confidential matters implicate a
constitutionally protected right.' 2,
1. The First Prong: Confidential Information Protected by the
Constitution
The Supreme Court provides little guidance in determining which
121. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600. Furthermore, the Whalen Court's citations
of Griswold and Stanley are instructive in that both implicitly held that a consti-
tutional right of informational privacy exists. See Comment, A Constitutional
Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal Matters: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P.
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEo. L.J. 219 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Perfecting Privacy Analysis).
122. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599; see also supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
123. See supra notes 67, 70 and accompanying text.
124. See Perfecting Privacy Analysis, supra note 121, at 233.
125. In Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a district court
noted that the holding in Paul may be limited. Crain, 443 F. Supp. at 209 n.3.
The court narrowly viewed its precedential effect: "[ilf a legitimate governmental
interest is served by maintaining the record publicly ... any additional notoriety
given the information in that record may not inflict any constitutionally cognizable
injury on the subject of the record." Id. To support this view, the court compared
Paul with a tort privacy claim in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975). See Id. In Cox, the Supreme Court stated that the privacy interests in tort
law diminish when implicated information appears on the public record. See id. (citing
Cox, 420 U.S. at 494-95).
Indeed, a possible criticism of the DeSanti holding is its automatic extension of
Paul to cases in which personal information is not part of the public record. See
supra notes 56-60, 87-96 and accompanying text.
126. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (emphasis added); see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
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personal information merits constitutional protection. 30 Neither the
Whalen decision nor the Nixon decision directly addressed this is-
sue.' In Whalen, the Court avoided the question by implicitly
acknowledging that the contested statute involved the disclosure of
private medical information.'32 The Nixon opinion refers to the
concept of a "legitimate expectation of privacy."' 33 The Court,
however, does not analyze what constitutes constitutionally "privi-
leged" information, 3 4 and, as a result, lower courts must determine
the precise standard themselves.'35
2. The Second Prong: The Standard of Review
Despite a finding that disclosure of a personal matter implicates
130. See Kimberlin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir.
1986) (exact nature and scope of informational privacy rights have never been fully
defined); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
131. Although both cases held that the contested statutes disclosed constitutionally
protected information, each holding was fact specific. See infra notes 132, 134.
132. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. In Whalen the Court listed several areas
which, if publicly disseminated, could threaten privacy interests: "[tihe collection
of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision
of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the
criminal laws . . . ." Id. at 605. Although noting that the right to collect and use
this data for public purposes is usually accompanied by a statutory nondisclosure
provision, the Supreme Court flatly refused to address when this right rises to a
level warranting constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 605-06; see also infra notes 230-
33 and accompanying text.
133. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
134. The Court declared:
[P]ublic officials ... are not wholly without constitutionally protected
privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by
them in their public capacity. Presidents who have established Presidential
libraries have usually withheld matters concerned with family or personal
finances, or have deposited such materials with restrictions on their
screening .... We may assume . . .for the purposes of this case, that
this pattern of defacto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence
gives rise to appellant's legitimate expectation of privacy in [his papers].
Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438
(7th Cir. 1986) (existence of privacy interest in inmate's commissary account depends
upon existence of reasonable expectation of privacy); Slayton v. Willingham, 726
F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (remanded to determine whether legitimate expectation
of privacy implicated in public disclosure of photographs). Holding that "personal
rights found in [the] guarantees of personal privacy must be limited to those which
are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' " DeSanti, 653
F.2d at 1088 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)), DeSanti would probably
restrict this right to information related to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, childrearing, and child education.
One author has suggested that the definition should encompass matters "personal
in character and potentially harmful or embarrassing if disclosed." Perfecting Privacy
Analysis, supra note 121, at 235 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605).
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a constitutionally protected interest, 36 in certain situations the gov-
ernment may still collect and disseminate this information without
violating the Constitution.'37 Therefore, it is necessary to apply the
proper standard of review to determine if the collection or disclosure
is constitutionally permissible.
In upholding various disclosure statutes, the Supreme Court has
employed a straight balancing test which weighs the government's
interest in gathering the confidential data against the extent to which
the disclosure transgresses the constitutionally protected privacy right.'38
As the Fifth Circuit noted, proper application of a balancing test 3 9
escapes both the severity of a "strict scrutiny" test'4 and the leniency
of a mere "rationally related" test.' 14 The balancing test allows the
136. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 (while contested statute threatened to
impair privacy interests, it did not establish constitutional violation); Nixon, 433
U.S. at 465 (same).
138. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
139. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979). In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit listed the most important
considerations for purposes of evaluation. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578; see
also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
140. The strict scrutiny standard requires that the statute be necessary to promote
a compelling governmental interest. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.3, at 530-31 (1986). Professor Gunther has described
the strict scrutiny test as a "rigid two-tier attitude" that is " 'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]. Only one case has
survived a strict scrutiny analysis. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (World War II military order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry
from certain West Coast areas was necessary to serve compelling need to prevent
espionage and sabotage); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Powell,
J., concurring) (affirmative action set-aside provision necessary to accomplish gov-
ernmental objective of eradicating effects of racial discrimination).
There are two other reasons why the balancing test is preferable to strict scrutiny:
(1) balancing avoids the potential arbitrariness involved in identification of com-
pelling state interests; and (2) balancing depicts the true process of judicial decision-
making and, thereby, may reduce "unprincipled decision-making." Perfecting Pri-
vacy Analysis, supra note 121, at 245.
141. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978). The rational
relation standard requires a rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate
state objective. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 14.3, at 530 (1986). Gunther depicts this test as one "with minimal scrutiny in
theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra note 140, at 8; see Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (law will be upheld as long
as classification is not "purely arbitrary"). But see F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("[tlhe classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike"). As of yet, the Supreme Court has reached no consensus
as to the applicable standard of review. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
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government to perform its functions effectively while safeguarding
the sanctity of vital privacy interests. 4 2
Il. Assessing Minors' Rights of Confidentiality
While constitutional rights are not automatically extended to chil-
dren,'4 "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone."'" Precisely because of children's legal minority
status,'14  both parents' 46 and the state as parens patriae'17 have
Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258-60 (1985) (majority opinion); id. at 3263-75 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's application of rationally-related test and con-
tending that majority invalidated zoning ordinance on heightened scrutiny grounds);
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982) (Court implies that
Royster Guano standard may no longer be proper standard of review).
142. For other Supreme Court cases employing a balancing test, see Detroit
Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 301, 313-17 (1979) (interests of N.L.R.B. and
labor union in access to employees' psychological, aptitude tests weighed against
confidentiality interest of employees); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) (court weighed state interest in housing ordinance restricting ability of
family members to live together against interest of family members to live as they
choose); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (statute
prohibiting use of contraceptives to curb extra-marital sexuality weighed against
intrusion into marital intimacy).
143. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (Bellotti 11).
144. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
145. A minor is defined as a "person who is under the age of legal competence."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 899 (5th ed. 1979).
In differentiating between the constitutional status of minors and adults, the
Supreme Court has emphasized "the peculiar vulnerability of children[,] their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner[,] and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
146. At one time the law viewed children as the property of their parents. See
Legal Rights of Children in the United States of America, 13 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 675, 676 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited as Legal Rights of Children]. Although
this view has been repudiated, see id. at 676-77, parents exercise an enormous
amount of control over the activities of their children. See L. HOULOATE, THE CHILD
& THE STATE 22-23 (1980). In fact, parental authority enjoys constitutional protection.
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parents have constitutional right to
decide whether to commit children to mental institution). The right of parents to
raise children free of unreasonable state interference has been categorized as fun-
damental. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents have right
to exclude children from compulsory school attendance); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon statute requiring parents to send children to public
school violates due process clause of fourteenth amendment by unreasonably in-
terfering with liberty right to rear children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (Nebraska statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages to children below
eighth grade impermissibly infringed liberty interest guaranteed by fourteenth amend-
ment). But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (Georgia statute requiring
only consent of illegitimate child's mother for adoption does not violate father's
due process right in matters of family life); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (despite wishes of parent to contrary, state can prohibit minors from dis-
tributing religious literature on public streets).
147. Literally meaning "the sovereign as parent," the parens patriae power denotes
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authority to restrict their rights. 4 The exercise of this authority,
however, is not absolute; neither parent " nor sovereign"' can abridge
the state's authority and duty to safeguard the welfare of dependent persons. See
Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in Law and Social Science,
in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 2 n.7 (1983). Accordingly, the state enacts
measures to protect children from abuse, neglect, and abandonment. See L. HOULOATE,
THE CHILD & THE STATE 17-20 (1980). As parens patriae, the state has broad
authority over the affairs of children. See, e.g., Legal Rights of Children, supra
note 146, at 677. For instance, children are denied the right to vote, hold office,
marry, drive motor vehicles, shoot firearms, gamble, enter into contracts, and
consent to sexual acts. See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations about Abandoning Youth to their "Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 605, 613 [hereinafter cited as Children's Liberation]; see also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1982) (state may ban distribution of materials showing
children engaged in sexual conduct even when materials not legally obscene);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) (state may inflict corporal punishment
on school children without violating eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968) (minors
may be denied access to pornographic material otherwise available to adults).
Under parens patriae, the state has created separate juvenile criminal proceedings.
See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1193 (1970). In an attempt to insulate youthful offenders from the harshness of
the adult system, the state seeks to promote rehabilitation rather than to adjudicate
guilt or punish juveniles. See id.; see also infra note 163.
148. These ideas date back to the Enlightenment. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 52-76 (1690). Denying children the legal status
of adults was seen as an ultimate good:
To turn [a child] loose to an unrestrained liberty before he has reason
to guide him is not ... allowing him the privilege of. his nature to be
free, but to thrust him out amongst brutes and abandon him to a state
as wretched and as much beneath that of a man as theirs. This is that
which puts the authority into the parents' hands to govern the minority
of their children.
Id. § 63.
149. When first addressing the issue of children's rights, the Supreme Court
presumed that the interests of the parent and child were the same. See Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Since then, the Court has been confronted with cases in which the two interests
were diametrically opposed. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 626 (1979)
(Bellotti I1) (unmarrried minors seeking abortions without the involvement of parents).
These cases typically concern parental consent statutes for pregnant minors seeking
abortions. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 439 (1983) (statute requiring blanket parental consent for all minors under
the age of fifteen seeking abortions held unconstitutional); H. L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 399-400 (1981) (statute requiring parental notice "if possible" of minors
seeking abortion upheld); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976):
(statute containing blanket parental consent requirement as condition for minors'
abortions during first trimester of pregnancy invalidated).
150. The Supreme Court has also held that the parens patriae power of the state
is not absolute. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(prohibition of distribution of contraceptives to minors violates privacy right); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibition
preventing students from wearing black armbands in school to protest Vietnam
War violated first amendment freedom of expression); School Dist. v. Schempp,
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certain constitutional rights enjoyed by children."'
A. Minors' Constitutional Guarantees of Protection and Liberty
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees
minors certain affirmative liberty rights 52 as well as specific rights
of protection.'53 Categorized as "choice rights,"'15 4 these liberty rights
presuppose a basic capacity for responsible action and permit the
child to make his own decisions.'55 Although children necessarily
lack many of these rights because of their immaturity,'5 6 in certain
situations the Constitution guarantees minors' choice rights.'57 By
contrast, "protection rights"'58 are available to minors despite their
incapacity for mature action. 5 9 Indeed, protection rights require no
minimum intellectual or psychological capacity.' 60 Because these rights
are more widely available to children, most children's rights cases
focus on constitutional guarantees safeguarding protection rights
rather than choice rights.' 6'
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state law may not require reading of Bible passages nor
recitation of Lord's prayer in public school).
151. Cases involving a child's constitutional rights generally fall in three categories:
(1) juvenile court procedures, see infra notes 162-75 and accompanying text; (2)
school settings, see infra note 185; and (3) reproductive autonomy. See infra notes
176-85 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 162-75 and accompanying text.
154. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 511-
17 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Status of Marriage].
155. See id. Hafen, Book Review, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1983) (reviewing
F. ZIMR RNG, THE CHAGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982)) [hereinafter cited
as Book Review].
156. The state prevents minors from exercising many choice rights based upon the
belief that children often lack the capacity for meaningful choice. See, e.g., supra
note 148.
157. Such choice rights include a minor girl's decision to terminate her pregnancy,
see infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text, and a child's first amendment rights.
See infra note 185.
158. See Constitutional Status of Marriage, supra note 154, at 511.
159. See Book Review, supra note 155, at 1048.
160. See Constitutional Status of Marriage, supra note 154, at 511. Protection
rights include rights to protection of property, physical protection, and procedural
due process. See id.
161. See id. The distinction between choice rights and protection rights is often
blurred because the denial of choice rights is intended to protect the immature and
vulnerable minor from exploitation by others. See id. at 513; Book Review, supra
note 155, at 1048-49; see, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (state may require court hearing to determine if minor girl is
sufficiently mature or emancipated to make her own decision to have abortion).
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1. Protection Rights
Cases safeguarding children's constitutional protection rights have
arisen primarily within the juvenile court system. 62 Although estab-
lished to foster a protective and nonadversarial relationship between
the state and the child-offender, 63 juvenile court proceedings had
often disregarded due process standards. 64 In reviewing these cases, 65
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea that a child has a
right to custody, but not to liberty.' 6 The Supreme Court, in holding
due process guarantees as an "indispensable foundation of individual
freedom,"' 6 has mandated that juvenile court procedures be meas-
ured by due process standards whenever the child is in danger of
loss of liberty due to confinement. 68
Accordingly, in juvenile proceedings, children possess constitutional
rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and priv-
ilege from self-incrimination. 69 The Constitution also protects ju-
venile offenders against double jeopardy 70 and the use of coerced
confessions in criminal proceedings. '7' In addition, the standard of
162. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 14-16 (1967). The Constitution also guarantees
protection rights for children in school. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975) (fourteenth amendment due process clause requires notice and hearing before
children can be suspended from school); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (equal protection clause protects school children from racial discrimination).
163. The juvenile court movement began at the turn of the century as a way
to insulate children from the harshness and severities of both substantive and
procedural criminal law. "The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the
procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical'
rather than 'punitive.' " In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). See generally S.
DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1985) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS].
164. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967) (juvenile offender denied consti-
tutional rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination of witness, and
privilege against self-incrimination).
165. See infra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
166. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. It is the loss of liberty which is significant, not
whether the proceeding is criminal or juvenile. See id. at 29.
167. Id. at 20.
168. See id. at 27-28. "[lIt would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not
require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase
'due process' [in juvenile proceedings]. Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a [minor] does not justify a kangaroo court." Id.; see infra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text.
169. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57.
170. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Double jeopardy is the constitutional
"prohibition against a second prosecution after a first trial for the same offense."
BLACK'S LAW DICrbONARY 440 (5th ed. 1979).
171. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948). In the early criminal cases concerning the admissibility of confessions
by juveniles, the Court went beyond the existing adult standard, and indicated that
special care should be exercised whenever evaluating the validity of juvenile confes-
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proof in juvenile proceedings is "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 7 2
Nevertheless, as long as the juvenile court system recognizes basic
constitutional rights for an accused person's protection, it need not
conform with all criminal trial requirements. 73 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that juveniles do not possess a constitutional
right to a jury'7 4 because it would not give juveniles greater protection
than they already possess.'"
2. Choice Rights
The Supreme Court's growing recognition that children are persons
entitled to certain affirmative constitutional guarantees has been
exemplified by the constitutional protection extended to minor's rights
to procure contraceptives' 76 and to make decisions on whether to
obtain abortions. 77 Holding that "[clonstitutional rights do not ma-
sions: "[w]hen . .. a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us-special
care in scrutinizing the record must be used." Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 (emphasis
added). Since then, the Court has formulated a new test for the admissibility of
confessions. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). While the Supreme Court
has not ruled specifically on whether the Miranda test applies to juveniles, virtually
all courts have applied the Miranda safeguards to minors. See Davis, supra note
163, § 3.10 -.12.
172. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
173. See Keni v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
174. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
175. On the contrary, the Court found that imposition of a jury trial would
impair the special function of the juvenile court to protect the child from the adult
criminal process:
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of
evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the
juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social file; about
repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of
juvenile and probation officers and social workers-all to the effect that
this will create the likelihood of prejudgment-chooses to ignore, it seems
to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal
attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.
Id. at 550. Specifically, the Court feared that the juvenile process would be subject
to unwarranted publicity. See id.
176. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Supreme
Court struck down a New York law prohibiting the distribution of nonprescription
contraceptives to children under the age of sixteen years. Describing "decisions
whether to accomplish or to prevent conception [as] ... the most private and
sensitive," id. at 685, the Court held that the restrictions were valid only if they
served a "significant state interest ... that [was] not present in the case of an
adult." Id. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)).
177. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (state may
not impose blanket requirement of third party consent to abortion for unmarried
minor during first trimester of pregnancy); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 647-48 (1979) (Bellotti II) (although requiring parental consent to abortion
may reflect state's important interest in protecting immature minors, state must
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ture and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority,"' 7 8 the Supreme Court has invalidated
statutes requiring an unmarried minor female to acquire parental
consent for an abortion.7 9 Moreover, the Court has adopted a
mature minor rule, holding that if a minor can prove herself mature
and able to understand the consequences of her decision, neither
the state nor her parents can infringe upon her right to exercise her
own judgment.8, 0
In distinguishing a minor's fundamental rights in this area of
autonomous privacy, however, the Court has implemented a less
vigorous variation of the strict scrutiny test.' 8 ' In contrast to the
compelling :state interest standard applicable to adult women, the
Court permits restrictions on minor's privacy rights if they serve a
"significant state interest.' 82 The Supreme Court premised this test
on the fact that the state has "greater latitude to regulate the conduct
of children . .. and [the fact that] the law has generally regarded
minors as having a lesser capability for making important deci-
sions. "'' 8 Nonetheless, despite this less stringent standard of re-
view, '8 these cases are significant in that they allow a minor's
constitutional rights to supersede the rights and interests of both
the parent and the state.
85
provide mature minors with judicial alternative to consent, allowing proof of maturity
or that abortion is in minors' best interests).
178. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. The Court, however, did not resolve the question
of when a state may justifiably restrict a minor's right to obtain an abortion.
179. See supra note 177.
180. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979) (Bellotti I!).
181. See supra note 140 for a discussion of the strict scrutiny test.
182. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75; see H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981)
(statute requiring parental notice of minor seeking abortion served "significant state
interest" by providing opportunity for parent to supply essential medical information
to physician). The Carey Court interpreted "significant state interest" in Danforth
as more lenient than the strict scrutiny standard. See Carey, 431, U.S. at 693 n.15.
But see infra note 184.
183. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15.
184. Justice Powell, however, asserted that the significant state interest test, "for
all practical purposes approaches the 'compelling state interest' standard." Id. at
706 (Powell, J., concurring).
185. The Court has also held that children are entitled to first amendment rights
in certain situations. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Supreme Court declared that public school
students had a first amendment right to wear armbands to publicize their protest
against governmental involvement in Vietnem: "[s]tudents in school as well as out
of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect . . . ." Id. at 511. However, as opposed to
the abortion decision, Tinker can also be viewed as a case protecting parental
child-rearing rights. See Children's Liberation, supra note 147, at 646. In affirming
students' right to wear armbands, the Court implicitly vindicated the child-rearing
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B. The Scope of a Constitutional Right of Informational
Privacy Extended to Minors
The Supreme Court has never attempted to define a constitutional
right of informational privacy for minors. Its major confidentiality
decisions involving privacy rights of adults, however, do not preclude
application of the holdings to children.1 16 In addition, the Court has
specifically emphasized the importance of juvenile confidentiality as
part of the rehabilitative model of the juvenile justice system. 87
and speech rights of parents who encouraged their children to make political
statements. See id.; see e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (compelling students to salute flag violated first amendment right to
free speech).
Despite the holding in Tinker, first amendment rights of speech are not co-
extensive with that of adults. The "state may permissibly determine that, at least
in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-
is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition
of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50
(1968) (footnote omitted) (constitutionally permissible for New York statute to
prohibit sale of pornographic materials to persons under seventeen years of age).
186. See, e.g., supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
187. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 24-25. While it did not evaluate the juvenile's right
to confidentiality on a constitutional level, the Court recognized that the state has
an interest in protecting juvenile anonymity precisely because of the juvenile's
minority status. See id. at 25. As opposed to adult criminal defendants, juveniles
are afforded anonymity in criminal proceedings so as to preserve rehabilitative
efforts. See id. In fact, the maintenance of juvenile confidentiality is considered
essential to the ultimate rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents. See Kfoury, Con-
fidentiality and the Juvenile Offender, 24 N.H. B.J. 135 (1983); see also Geis,
Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons, 23 MONT. L. REV. 141 (1962).
However, this confidentiality interest is not always of primary importance when
weighed against a conflicting constitutional right. For example, in Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974), a criminal defendant sought to cross-examine a juvenile and
alleged that a protective order prohibiting references to the juvenile's "delinquent"
record violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation. See 415 U.S. 308, 310-15
(1974). Although it acknowledged the juvenile's interest in confidentiality, the Court
held that this interest was outweighed by the defendant's right to confront adverse
witnesses. See id. at 320. This case, however, does not address substantive juvenile
issues; rather, it is regarded as an evidentiary decision. See Kfoury, Confidentiality
and the Juvenile Offender, 24 N.H. B.J. 135, 137 (1983). In addition, the Court
has held that the first amendment's mandate of freedom of the press overrides a
juvenile's confidentiality interest. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing, 443 U.S. 97,
104-05 (1979) (unconstitutional for state to impose criminal penalty on newspaper
for publishing identity of juvenile when it obtained information lawfully); Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per curiam) (state may
not prohibit publication of information obtained at judicial proceedings when open
to the public). See generally Comment, Delinquency Hearings and the First Amend-
ment: Reassessing Juvenile Court Confidentiality Upon the Demise of "Conditional
Access," 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 123, 126-31 (1979-80).
Hence, while nondisclosure of a juvenile's name and record may be deemed a
constitutionally protected interest, other constitutional rights mandating the dissem-
ination of this information in some circumstances may outweigh the privacy right.
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A constitutional right to confidentiality, therefore, should be ex-
tended to children. As a substantive protective right,' a right of
informational privacy is necessary to safeguard the privacy interests
of all minors. In fact, it is precisely because of children's immaturity
and vulnerability 9 that informational privacy is necessary to safe-
guard their privacy interests.
IV. Protecting the Identities of AIDS' Youngest Victims
A. AIDS: A Deadly Disease
AIDS is a fatal disease complex characterized by a collapse in
the body's resistance against disease.' 90 AIDS is caused by the retro-
virus, HTLV-III,19 1 which damages an individual's immune system. 92
188. The right to informational privacy is a protection right as opposed to a
choice right. See supra notes 153, 158-61 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., supra notes 158-61.
190. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FACTS ABOUT AIDS(Aug. 1985) (available in AIDS packet compiled by the CDC); see infra notes 191-95
and accompanying text.
191. Researchers at the Pasteur Institute in Paris first identified this causative
agent in 1983, and called it lymphadenopathy-associated virus ("LAV"). See Laur-
ence, supra note 4, at 84. In April 1984, federal researchers announced that human
T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III) was the cause of AIDS. See id. These
two viruses are in fact the same. See id.; see also Antibodies to a Retrovirus
Etiologically Associated with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in Pop-
ulations with Increased Incidences of the Syndrome, 33 MoRBIrTY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 377 (1984), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note I, at 62;
Altman, French Sue U.S. Over AIDS Virus Discovery, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1985,
at 1, col. 4. In medical literature, this virus also has been called the AIDS virus,
AIDS-associated virus (AAV), AIDS-related virus (ARV), HTLV-III/LAV, and
LAV/HTLV-III. See MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 1. This Note will refer
to the virus as HTLV-IlI.
AIDS is the most severe manifestation of the HTLV-1I1 infection. The immune
system is so supressed that its victims become susceptible to malignancies and
opportunistic infection. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see also infra
notes 192-95 and accompanying text. A less serious form of AIDS is AIDS-related
complex (ARC). Caused by infection with HTLV-I1, ARC has at least two symptoms
of AIDS, carrying a significant but imprecisely determined likelihood of progression
to AIDS. See MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 13; See SPECIAL REPORT, supra
note i, at 5. Most people exposed to HTLV-III, however, do not develop symptoms.
See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. It is estimated that over one million
Americans have this asymptomatic infection. See id.
192. For a detailed and technical discussion on how HTLV-III attacks and destroys
the immune system, see Laurence, supra note 4, at 84. Recent evidence suggests
that this deadly virus can devastate the victim's brain as well as his immune system.
See Ho, Isolation of HTL V-Il from Cerebrospinal Fluid and Neural Tissues of
Patients with Neurologic Syndromes Related to the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1493 (1985); Schmeck, Grim New Ravage of
AIDS: Brain Damage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at Cl, col. 6.
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As a result, the normal functioning of the immune system becomes
so impaired that AIDS victims are vulnerable to rare illnesses, can-
cers, and other opportunistic infections. 93 The reduced resistance
caused by HTLV-III unleashes these infections,'94 and hence, it is
not AIDS, but the HTLV-III virus that is transmissible. 95
From July, 1981 to December, 1985, the number of AIDS-related
cases reported by the Federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) 196
rose from twenty-six'97 to over 15,000.198 Of all the reported cases
to date, half of the victims have died' 99 and none has been cured. 00
Currently, eighty percent of AIDS victims die within two years after
diagnosis.20' Government and health experts expect the number of
AIDS-related deaths to continue to escalate. 202
193. See Laurence, supra note 4, at 84.
194. See MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 2.
195.! See District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., No. i4940/85,
slip op. at 3 (Sup. Ct. Queens County, Feb. 11, 1986) (other portions published in 130
Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325); Public Health Service Plan for the Prevention
and Control of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PUBLIC HEALTH
REPORTS 453 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Public Health Service Plan].
196. See supra note 4 for a discussion on the functions of the CDC.
197. Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Among Homosexual Men-New York
City and California, 30 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 305 (1981), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 2.
198. As of December 1, 1985, AIDS-related cases numbered 15,172. See Rec-
ommendations for Assisting in the Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IlI/Lyniphadenopathy-Associated Virus and Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 721 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Prevention of Perinatal Transmission).
199. See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME
(AIDS) WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT (Feb. 17, 1986).
200. There is presently no known cure for AIDS. See MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note
I, at 25-26; Public Health Service Plan, supra note 195; Hunt, Teaming Up
Against AIDS, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 ("[M]aking an
effective vaccine will be extremely difficult. The effects of the virus are far wider
than most people realize . . . ."); see also Altman, Who Will Volunteer For an
AIDS Vaccine?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Cl, col. 1 (due to the extreme
difficulty in producing safe vaccine, "catch-22" situation exists for those who use
it). Although a new experimental drug called azidothymidine ("ATZ") has proven
effective in improving the health of certain AIDS patients for a limited time, the
drug is not a cure for AIDS and might even be harmful to some patients. See
Eckholm, AIDS Test Drug Prolongs Lives In Some Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20,
1986, at I, col. 2; see also Eckholm, AIDS Drug Is Raising Host of Thorny Issues,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, at 38, col. I ("effectiveness of AZT has been shown
only briefly among particular kinds of patients").
201. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, AIDS INFORMATION BULLETIN: THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE RESPONSE TO AIDS 1 (Sept. 1985) (available in AIDS packet
compiled by CDC) [hereinafter cited as AIDS INFORMATION BULLETIN).
202. Using conservative figures, government researchers estimate that one million
Americans have already been infected with HTLV-1I1 and project that within five
to ten years, that number will rise to at least two or three million. See Boffey,
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1. Means of Transmission
HTLV-III has been detected predominantly in blood and semen
and, to a lesser degree, in saliva and tears. 23 Since the virus is
transmitted only through the exchange of bodily fluids, 2°4 it spreads
through sexual intercourse with an infected partner,0 5 injection of
infected blood or blood products,2°0 and pre-natal exposure to an
AIDS in the Future: Experts Say Deaths Will Climb Sharply, N.Y. Times, Jan.
14, 1986, at Cl, col. 4; see also MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 36 (AIDS
cases doubling every twelve months; no decline expected due to absence of preventive
vaccine); Pear, Tenfold Increase in AIDS Death Toll Is Expected by "91, N.Y.
Times, June 13, 1986, at Al, col. 3 (total number of AIDS cases and deaths will
increase tenfold in next five years). Furthermore, in the next five years, AIDS
cases will reach a cumulative total of 270,000 with 179,000 deaths. See Eckholm,
Broad Alert Over AIDS: Social Battle Is Shifting, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1986, at
CI, col. 1.
203. See Eckholm, Fears on AIDS Termed Largely Without Cause, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 1. Recent studies indicate that the presence of the virus
in saliva not only is rare, but also that its concentration is "ten-thousandfold
lower" than that in the blood of the same person. Eckholm, Saliva Discounted
as an AIDS Threat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, at A19, col. 1. See Ho, Infrequency
of Isolation of HTL V-III Virus from Saliva in AIDS, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED.,
1606 (1985). In addition, transmission of the virus has never been documented
through either saliva or tears. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission
of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-As-
sociated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 691
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Prevention of Transmission in the Workplace]. Nor has
it been isolated in perspiration, urine, feces, or vomit. See MEDICAL ANSWERS,
supra note 1, at 5; see also District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
130 Misc. 2d. 398, 405, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 330 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986).
204. HTLV-III may be transmitted by any activity "that involves direct mucous-
membrane or bloodstream contact with an infected partner's blood or sperm."
MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 5; see infra notes 205-07 and accompanying
text.
205. Almost 75% of all adult AIDS cases are related to sexual transmission.
See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. Most of these cases arise from homosexual
contact. Seventy-three percent of all AIDS victims are homosexual or bisexual men.
See AIDS INFORMATION BULLETIN, supra note 201, at 1. Although it has been well
documented that the virus can be transmitted heterosexually, it is unclear how
effectively the virus can be transmitted from women to men. See Boffey, AIDS
in the Future: Experts Say Deaths Will Climb Sharply, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986,
at Cl, col. 4; see also Heterosexual Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type lll/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 561 (1985), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 112. But see
Altman, Study Says AIDS in Haiti Spreads Mainly by Heterosexual Activity, N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1986, at Al, col. I (heterosexual contact is predominant means
of spread of AIDS in Haiti); Altman, AIDS Study May Show How Women Infect
Men, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at A16, col. I (recent evidence suggests that virus
present in female genital secretions, supporting thesis that women can transmit
virus to men through sexual intercourse).
206. The major means of transmission is through sharing needles among intra-
venous drug users so that infected, blood is injected into the body. See SPECIAL
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infected mother. 07 As a result, AIDS most frequently strikes two
widely-recognized, high-risk categories: (1) homosexual and bisexual
men;2 8 and (2) intravenous drug users who share needles and sy-
ringes.2°9 Health experts have consistently asserted that AIDS is not
a highly contagious disease,210 emphasizing that no evidence supports
the proposition that HTLV-III can be transmitted by water, air,
food, or any other casual contact."'
REPORT, supra note I, at 7. Intravenous drug use currently accounts for 17% of
all reported AIDS cases. See Brody, Separating the Myths and Fears from the
Facts on How AIDS Is and Isn't Transmitted, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at C6,
col. 3. Approximately 0.6% have contracted AIDS through transfusion of blood
or blood products, see id., most being hemophiliacs who are dependent on blood
clotting Factor VIII. See id. This means of contraction now has been "virtually
eliminated" as a result of the routine use of a diagnostic test to screen all donated
blood. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8; see also Changing Patterns of
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Hemophilia Patients-United States, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 241 (1985), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS,
supra note I, at 88 (number of hemophilia-associated AIDS cases stabilizing and/
or declining). But see Eckholm, 700 Might Have Got AIDS Virus In Transfusions,
Blood Bank Says, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at Al, col. 2 (seven hundred people
who received transfusions in New York area may be contaminated with AIDS);
Boffey, Failures Reported in AIDS Blood Tests, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1986, at C3,
col. 5 (screening test in certain cases fails to detect contaminated blood).
207. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 205.
209. See supra note 206. The number of intraveneous drug users afflicted with
AIDS has risen steadily over the years. See Nix, More and More AIDS Cases
Found Among Drug Abusers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1985, at 51, col. 1. For
example, in New York State, the proportion of AIDS cases contracted through
the sharing of needles rose from 180 in 1981 to 33% by 1985. See Id. Health
authorities consider these drug addicts as the major source of transmission of AIDS
into the heterosexual population. See id.; Heterosexual Transmission of Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type lll/Lymphadenopathy-Assoclated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 561, reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note 1,
at 112. Among children inflicted with AIDS, fifty-four percent contracted the
disease from a mother who either was a drug user or had a heterosexual partner
who used drugs. See Altman, New Fear on Drug Use and AIDS, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 6, 1986, at I, col. 2; id. at 30, col. 2.
210. See supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Prevention of Trans-
mission in the Workplace, supra note 203, at 691-94; Education and Foster Care
of Children Infected with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenop-
athy-Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 517 [hereinafter
cited as Education and Foster Care of Children], reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS,
supra note 1, at 106; Eckholm, Study of AIDS Victims' Families Doubts Disease
Is Transmitted Casually, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1986, at B7, col. 1. But see New
York Study on AIDS Criticized, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1986, at A13, col. 3 (study
concluding that AIDS cannot be transmitted casually criticized as. "premature").
Although some researchers have alleged that African swine fever may be a causal
link to AIDS transmission, see Nordheimer, Florida Pig Farm Poses AIDS Riddle,
N.Y. Times, May 26, 1986, at 7, col. 1, the CDC has refuted this contention. See
Schneider, No Swine Fever Link to AIDS Seen, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1986, at
C12, col. 5.
211. Empirical studies indicate that AIDS cannot be transmitted even through
19861 PRIVACY AND AIDS CHILDREN
2. AIDS' Most Tragic Victims: Children
In December of 1982, the CDC first reported cases of infants
infected with AIDS. 2 Cases of pediatric AIDS 3 currently number
over 20021" and represent one percent of all reported AIDS cases. Most
close interpersonal contact. District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
130 Misc. 2d 398, 405-08, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 330-32 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1986). For example, in a study of 500 families who lived with persons infected
with HTLV-II, not one family member contracted the disease through non-sexual
contact. See id. at 405-06, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 331. Despite shared beds, food, baby
bottles, toothbrushes, and eating utensils, the virus was transmitted only to those
family members who were sex partners of infected patients or who had received
blood transfusions. See id. A more recent and detailed study conducted by Dr.
Gerald H. Friedland of the Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx, New York
supported these conclusions. After questioning 101 household members including
children, researchers determined that transmission of AIDS through household
contact is "virtually non-existent." See Friedland, Lack of Transmission of HTL V-
Ill/LA V Infection to Household Contacts of Patients With AIDS or AIDS-Related
Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEw ENO. J. MED. 344 (1986). Use of
the same bathtub, toilet, bed, drinking glass, towel, and razor did not provide a
means of transmission of HTLV-III. See id. at 346-47. Even hugging and kissing
on the lips has failed to spread the virus. See id.
A study of 1,758 health care workers attending AIDS patients provides further
evidence that AIDS cannot be contracted through casual contact. See District 27, 130
Misc. 2d at 406-07, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 331. Despite the fact that over 400 workers actu-
ally stuck themselves with needles containing infected blood, only twenty-six were
found anti-body positive. See id. at 406, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 331. Twenty-three of those
twenty-six fell within a recognized high risk group. See id. For one of those workers,
epidemiologic information was not available. See id. With regard to the remaining
two, no pre-exposure blood sample was taken to verify that infection came from
their needle stick injury as opposed to a prior exposure. See id.; see also Update:
Prospective Evaluation of Health Care Workers Exposed Via the Parental or Mucous-
Membrane Route to Blood or Body Fluids from Patients with Acquired Immuno-
deficiency Syndrome-United States, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
101 (1985), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 82. But see New York
Study on AIDS Criticized, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1986, at A13, col. 3 (study
concluding that AIDS cannot be transmitted casually criticized as "premature");
Nordheimer, Florida Pig Farm Poses AIDS Riddle, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1986,
at 7, col. I (African swine fever causal link with AIDS).
212. See Unexplained Immunodeficiency and Opportunistic Infections in Infants-
New York, New Jersey, California, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
665 (1982), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS, supra note i, at 28; Possible Transfusion-
Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-California, 31 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 652 (1982), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS,
supra note 1, at 26.
213. The CDC defines pediatric AIDS "as a child who has had: (1) [a] reliably
diagnosed disease at least moderately indicative of underlying cellular immunode-
ficiency, and (2) [nip. known cause of underlying cellular immunodeficiency or any
other reduced resistance reported to be associated with that disease." Education
and Foster Care of Children, supra note 210, at 106.
214. As of Febuary 17, 1986, the CDC reported 251 pediatric cases of AIDS.
See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS)
WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT 1 (Feb. 17, 1986).
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of these children under the age of thirteen caught the virus in utero
from their infected mothers during pregnancy2 ' or during labor and
delivery. 2 6 Another eighteen percent have been infected by trans-
fusions of blood or blood products.
217
The plight of these children first came into the public eye in 1984,
when a school district decided to segregate three young AIDS victims
from their classmates. 281 Since then, the issue of whether to integrate
AIDS-afflicted children into the classroom with healthy children has
caught national attention, with at least eight states and the District
of Columbia embroiled in the conflict. 2 9 In some cases, decisions
to admit or exclude the student have not settled the controversy,
but rather have fueled heated debates and public outrage.
220
215. Of the reported cases, 76% have as their only known risk factor a mother
in a group with increased prevalence of HTLV-Ill infection. See Prevention of
Perinatal Transmission, supra note 198, at 722. Pregnant women with AIDS run
a great risk of transmitting the virus to their unborn child. See id. Some experts
estimate a rate of transmission to be as high as 65%. See id.; AIDS Risk to
Unborn Is Seen, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1985, at 12, col. 1. Most children born with
HTLV-III develop symptoms at five to six months of age and are diagnosed with
a life-threatening infection at nine months. See SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
18. Their life expectancy rarely exceeds two or three years. See id.
216. See Prevention of Perinatal Transmission, supra note 198, at 722. In addition,
one infant may have contracted the virus through ingestion of contaminated breast
milk. See id.
217. See id. The risk factor is missing or incomplete for the remaining six percent.
See id.
218. See Clendinen, Schools in New York Will Admit An AIDS Pupil but Not
3 Others: "Epidemic of Fear" in U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
Since the press has published their first names and described them as female triplets
entering first grade, the issue of their right to confidentiality is moot. See id.
219. Although involving fewer than twenty children, the issue of whether children
should attend regular school classes has reached the classrooms in New York, New
Jersey, Connecticut, California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,
and the District of Columbia. See id.; Philadelphia Schools Act, N.Y. Times, Nov.
22, 1985, at B13, col. I; Racine Bars AIDS Pupils, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1985,
at B13, col. I. The reason for the paucity is that most of these young victims
have died or are too ill to attend classes. See supra note 215.
220. In Kokomo, Indiana, the decision to exclude a thirteen-year-old hemophiliac
afflicted with AIDS from school resulted in a lawsuit to reinstate the boy. See
"Great" Present for AIDS Boy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at B7, col. 3; 13-
Year-Old AIDS Victim Starts Attending Classes by Telephone, N.Y. Times, Aug.
27, 1985, at A19, col. I. After a semester of litigation, a county chief medical
officer ruled that the boy posed no health threat to his classmates and should be
readmitted to school. See Indiana School Told to Readmit 14-Year-Old Student
With AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, at A12, col. 2. The child remained in
school, however, for only one day. See Barron, AIDS Sufferer's Return To Classes
Is Cut Short, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1986, at 6, col. 1. While students boycotted
classes and picketed the school, a group of parents brought the case before the
county circuit court and claimed that the boy's attendance at school violated an
Indiana law dealing with communicable diseases. See id. The circuit court then
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Many parents fear that epidemiological studies have not sufficiently
documented all means of transmission.?' In particular, parental
concerns focus on the possibilities of transmission through the contact
of AIDS-infected blood into an open cut of a healthy child,2 2 or
enjoined the boy from attending classes until a determination of this issue had
been made. See id. A month and a half later, the circuit court dissolved the
injunction. See Indiana Judge Allows AIDS Victim Back in'School, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 11, 1986, at A14, col. 1. The issue of confidentiality is moot due to the
broad exposure the media gave to his identity. See id.
In addition, a decision to admit an AIDS sufferer in New Jersey sparked protests
and class boycotts by irate parents. See School Boycott Grows Over AIDS Fears,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1985, at 30, col. 3. Approximately 160 out of 251 enrolled
students boycotted classes in Washington Borough, New Jersey. See id. In New
York, early boycotts kept more than 11,000 elementary and junior high school
students out of two Queens school districts. See Rohter, Start of Classes in AIDS
Protest, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at BI, col. 2. A five-week trial contesting
the admittance followed. See District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986). The policy
of both New Jersey and New York is to maintain the confidentiality of the AIDS
child's identity. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
To date, only school systems in New York City, Swansea, Massachusetts and
Philadelphia have publicly decided to admit AIDS victims to class. See Clendinen,
Schools in New York Will Admit An AIDS Pupil, but Not 3 Others: "Epidemic
of Fear" in U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2; id. at 22, col. 1; see
also Philadelphia Schools Act, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, at B13, col. I. Federal
and state governments, however, have issued guidelines recommending the admittance
of certain AIDS children to school. See Education and Foster Care of Children,
supra note 210, at 107-8; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE (Nov. 1985); REco ~iNDE GUMELDnS FOR PROVIDING EDUCA-
TION TO STUDENTS wITH AIDS/ARC OR HTLV-III INFECTION [in Texas] (Oct. 31,
1985) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS GUIDELINES]; DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDING
EDUCATION TO STUDENTS WITH AIDS/ARC (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter cited as CON-
NECTICUT GUmELNES]; NEW JERSEY STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH, FACTS ABOUT AIDS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS [hereinafter cited
as NEW JERSEY FACTS ABOUT AIDS]; seel also STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, MEMORANDUM, SERIES No. 85-92, GUIDELINES FOR THE EDUCATION AND
DAY-CARE OF CHILDREN INFECTED WITH HUMAN T-LYMPHOATROPIC VIRUS TYPE
III/LYMPHODENOPATHY-AssOCIATED VIRUS (HTLV III/LAV) (Sept. 4, 1985)
(hereinafter cited as NEW YORK GUIDELINES]; MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, AIDS/AcQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
POLICY (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MASSACHUSETTS ATTENDANCE POLICY].
221. See Barron, AIDS Sufferer's Return To Classes Is Cut Short, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1986, at 6, col. 1; McFadden, Schools in New York Will Admit An AIDS
Pupil but Not 3 Others: Case Believed in Remission, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985,
at 1, col. 1; id. at 22, col. 6; see, e.g., Fried, 2 Local Boards Call for a Delay
on AIDS Pupils, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1985, at B5, col. 1. See generally District
27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, -502 N.Y.S.2d
325 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986).
222. See Purnick, Panel to Decide AIDS School Cases, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1985, at 26, col. 1. At the Queens trial, the City of New York presented much
testimony rebutting the theory of HTLV-II1 transmission through a bleeding injury.
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIV
through a bite inflicted by the AIDS victim on a classmate or
teacher." Many parents and school officials, therefore, advocate
the exclusion of these AIDS children from normal classroom in-
struction.21 4 Failing such an exclusion, parents request that the ident-
ities of these AIDS victims be disclosed to key school officials.225
B. Defining Parameters of a Constitutional Right of
Confidentiality for Schoolchildren Afflicted with AIDS
1. Information in Medical Records as a Constitutionally
Protected Privacy Interest
Medical records inherently contain highly personal information
about an individual. Disclosure of their contents could cause em-
barrassment and humiliation, loss of employment, and difficulties
in maximizing future financial, educational, and social opportuni-
ties.226 The potentially adverse effects of disclosure create a privacy
interest in medical information which has long been recognized and
endorsed by the medical profession in its own code of ethics. 227
See Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 12-15; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note
1 at 9-10; see also CONNECTICUT GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at 5-9; STATE OF
NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: 100
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 10-12 (Oct. 24, 1985) [hereinafter cited as 100 QUESTIONS].
223. See Purnick, Panel to Decide AIDS School Cases, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1985, at 26, col. 1; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10; see also Brief of
Respondents, supra note 10, at 15-17; 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 222, at 12. In
fact, this fear has been partially realized. In California, an AIDS-infected four-
year-old bit a classmate. See Panel Suggests Test for Boy With AIDS Who Bit
Another, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1986, at 37, col. 6. Fortunately, the boy did not
break the skin of his classmate. See id.
224. See supra note 220; see also Special School Planned to Avoid AIDS Victim,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1986, at 24, col. 6 (alternative school established to avoid
presence of AIDS student in public school).
225. See Perlez, 6 AIDS Children to Attend Schools, City Officials Say, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at BI, col. 5; id. at B3, col. 1; Rohter, Hearing Begins
on AIDS Child in Public School, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 6; see
also Brief of Petitioners, supra note 9, at 48-60.
226. See Note, Privacy Rights in Medical Records, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165
(1985); cf. Hammond v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (patients often disclose "embarrassing, disgraceful, or incriminating"
information to their physicians).
227. The Hippocratic Oath reads "[W]hatsoever I shall see or hear in the course
of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men,
if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such
things to be holy secrets." The Hippocratic Oath, reprinted in C. McFADDEN,
MEDICAL ETHICS 431-32 (1961).
The Florence Nightingale Pledge for Nurses reads: "I will do all in my power
to elevate the standard of my profession, and will hold in confidence all personal
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In recent years, legislatures28 and the courts229 have addressed the
pressing need to protect personal information in medical records.
In fact, even without conclusive direction from the Supreme Court, 230
dicta from the Whalen opinion acknowledge that disclosure of med-
ical information can abridge constitutional privacy rights. For ex-
ample, the Whalen Court recognized that "a host of . . . unpleasant
invasions of privacy . . . are associated with many facets of health
care."2 "' Furthermore, in its conclusion, the Whalen Court character-
ized "the supervision of public health"' 2 as an area which, if publicly
disseminated, could threaten privacy interests .2  Hence, Whalen sup-
ports the proposition that disclosure of the identity of an AIDS
victim jeopardizes a privacy interest protected by the Constitution.
2. Balancing the State Interest in Disclosure with the Child's
Right of Confidentiality
Although the Constitution safeguards the interest of AIDS victims
in controlling disclosure of their medical condition,2 M this consti-
matters committed to my keeping, and all family affairs coming to my knowledge
in the practice of my calling." Pledge of Florence Nightingale, reprinted in C.
McFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS 432 (1961).
228. Stating that the right to privacy is "personal and fundamental," Congress
enacted the Privacy Act in 1974. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579,
88 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)). The Privacy Act
forbids government agencies and employers from disclosing an individual's records
except in certain situations. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982). The Privacy Act
specifically includes an individual's medical history as part of his records. See 5
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1982).
In New York, medical reports to the State and City Departments of Health are
confidential pursuant to the Public Health Law, and disclosure is limited to specified
uses: "sluch [medical] information when received by the commissioner [of Health],
or his authorized representatives, shall be kept confidential and shall be used solely
for the purposes of medical or scientific research or the improvement of the quality
of medical care through the conduction of medical audits." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 206(1)0) (McKinney 1971).
229. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (evaluating constitutionality of
statute mandating recordation of persons using certain prescriptive drugs); United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (1980) (determining constitu-
tionality of subpoena directing employer to produce medical records of employees).
230. See supra notes 56-86 and accompanying text.
231. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. In fact, in a footnote, the Court mentioned
various medical disclosure laws that constitute possible invasions of privacy. See
id. at 602 n.29.
232. Id. at 605.
233. See id. The Third Circuit has stated that "[t]here can be no question that
[a person's] medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature,
are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection." United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
234. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
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tutional protection is not absolute z5 and must be scrutinized against
any competing state interest in disclosure.23 6 In its duty to safeguard
the health and welfare of the community, the state may require
disclosure of certain medical conditions to the state. 237 Hence, sta-
tutory reporting requirements of AIDS-related cases do not infringe
a constitutionally protected privacy interest under all circumstances. 28
.One important purpose of such a law is to facilitate and gather
-scientific research on the causes of AIDS.239 Thus, the issue presented
here does not concern the permissibility of governmental collection
of AIDS-related data, but rather, the constitutionality of govern-
mental dissemination of this information.2 40
C. Divergent Statutory Policies Limiting the Scope of Disclosure
In its advisory guidelines 22 on the education of children infected
with AIDS, the CDC emphasized the importance of maintaining
confidentiality:
Persons involved in the care and education of HTLV-III/LAV-
infected children should respect the child's right to privacy, in-
cluding maintaining confidential records. The number of personnel
who are aware of the child's condition should be kept at a
minimum needed to assure proper care of the child and to detect
situations where the potential for transmission may increase (e.g.,
bleeding injury). 24 2
235. In Whalen, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that many disclosures
of private medical information to doctors, hospital personnel, insurance companies,
and public health agencies are an "essential part of modern medical practice." 429
U.S. at 602.
236. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
balancing test. See infra notes 237, 239 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the state interests.
237. See supra note 235.
238. See supra note 23 for the Supreme Court's discussion of areas in which
compulsory reporting is constitutionally permissible.
239. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 206(1)0) (McKinney 1971) ("ltlhe
Commissioner shall ... cause to be made such scientific studies and research which
have for their purpose the reduction of morbidity and mortality. . .
240. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
241. See Education and Foster Care of Children, supra note 210, at 107-08. The
guidelines of the CDC are only recommendations furnished to assist state and local
health departments in promulgating their own laws and policies. See District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., No. 14940/85, slip op. at 17 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1986) (other portions published at 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d
325 (1986)); see also supra note 4.
242. Education and Foster Care of Children, supra note 210, at 108 (emphasis
added). The CDC also warned parents against the "potential for social isolation
should [their] child's condition become known to others in the care or educational
setting." Id. at 107.
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The precise meaning of this "minimum" disclosure recommendation,
however, is unclear and subject to varying interpretations.2 43 For
example, while some states maintain strict confidentiality of the
identities of these children, '" others permit disclosure to a teacher,
an administrator, or a nurse. 245
Nonetheless, despite bona fide efforts to respect and maintain the
child's right to confidentiality, even limited disclosure to select school
personnel can abridge a constitutionally protected privacy interest.2
46
Unless the state can show a prevailing public interest, these disclosures
impermissibly invade the child's constitutional right of privacy. 247
D. The Parameters of the Right of Confidentiality for a Child
with AIDS
To ensure a proper balancing between an individual's privacy and
the state's interests, all criteria delineated by the Third Circuitl4
should be considered. The first three factors assess the type of record
disclosed, its content, and its potential harm in subsequent non-
consensual disclosure. As previously indicated, revealing the medical
condition of these children is likely to result in ostracism and social
isolation.2 4 9 Such stigmatization would have psychological repercus-
243. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 67. The recommendations
suggest neither the particular person nor numbers of persons within the school
system who should be informed of the identity of the AIDS child. See infra notes
244-45 and accompanying text.
244. Such states include New York, New Jersey, and California. See, e.g., NEw
YORK GUIDELINES, supra note 220; NEw JERSEY FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note
220; Telephone interview with William Burson, Education Department of California
(Mar. I1, 1986) (to date, California has not published state guidelines for the care
of school-age AIDS victims).
245. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS ATTENDANCE POUCY, supra note 220, at 2; TEXAS
GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at 2; CONNECTICUT GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at
1.
246. The question, therefore, becomes whether this infringement is constitutionally
permissible. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. The return of a 14-year-old
hemophiliac to school marked a day of protests and boycotts. See Barron, AIDS
Sufferer's Return To Classes Is Cut Short, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1986, at 6, col.
1. While some students picketed in front of the school protesting the boy's ad-
mittance, 43% of the student body failed to attend classes that day. See id. Although
few protests occurred the following school year, students expressed apprehension
about the boy's presence, warning "[als long as he keeps his distance, he's o.k.,"
and "[lust as long as I don't sit by him." AIDS Victim Starts School After 2
Years, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at AI5, col. 3. In New York City, one AIDS-
infected child was physically and emotionally capable of attending school, but as
a result of a breach of confidentiality, health and school authorities recommended
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sions and discourage the child from attending school.250
The fourth criterion considers the potential harm to the confidential
relationship which generated the information. 25' A breach of strict
confidentiality could discourage not only physicians from reporting
the disease, but also potential victims from seeking treatment. 25 2
Inadequate safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure compound
this problem. For example, by releasing this information to school
personnel, the state essentially loses the abililty to control its dis-
semination to third persons. In addition, if a large number of school
personnel have access to this private information, the risk of public
disclosure throughout the school system substantially increases .2
The last two criteria employed by the Third Circuit evaluate the
need for disclosure and how it would advance public policy. 2 4 The
alternative education. See District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
No. 14940/85, slip op. at 21 (Sup. Ct. Queens County Feb. 11, 1986) (other por-
tions published at 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1986)). At the Queens trial,
counsel for petitioners offered to stipulate that the AIDS child would face ostracism
if confidentiality was breached. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 64; see
also infra note 269 and accompanying text.
250. One educational expert has testified that "the social pressure from other
students, teachers, adults, parents would be so great that there is a high degree
of liklihood [sic] that the child wouldn't be able to attend school." Brief of
Respondent-Intervenor, supra note 10, at 58-59; see also supra note 249. See generally
Brief of Respondent-lntervenor, supra note 10, at 54-60; Brief of Respondents,
supra note 10, at 61-68.
251. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
252. Cf. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (confidentiality between doctor and patient is necessary to promote full
disclosure by patient and to maintain efficient health system); see also Brief of
Respondents, supra note 10, at 65; King, Doctors Cite Stigma of AIDS In Declining
to Report Cases, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1986, at Al, col. I (due to stigma of
AIDS, doctors ascribe cause of death of AIDS victims to specific disease rather
than to AIDS).
253. The guidelines permitting disclosure to school personnel suggest no mech-
anism to preserve the child's confidentiality other than limiting it to persons with
"a direct need to know." See, e.g., CONNECTICUT GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at
1; TExAS GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at 2; see also MASSACHUSETTS ATTENDANCE
POLICY, supra note 220, at 2 (child's identity should be revealed only to people
with "an absolute need to know"). Even proponents supporting disclosure implicitly
concede that the preservation of confidentiality is premised upon the teacher's ability
to maintain this confidentiality. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 9, at 53-54.
Many experts contend that if school officials or teachers were entrusted with this
information, the identity of the AIDS child would invariably become public. See
Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 63-64; Brief of Respondent-Intervenor,
supra, note 10 at 57-58; see also Purnick, Pupils With AIDS a Risk, Koch Says,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1985, at 25, col. 3 (mayor doubted identity of AIDS student
would remain confidential).
Even teachers "with best intentions" inadvertently might have reservations about
being near an AIDS child or hesitate attending to incidences involving blood. Brief
of Respondents, supra note 10, at 58 (Spencer Testimony).
254. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit found that
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statutory purpose for disclosure is twofold: (1) to enable the school
to protect its students, 25 and (2) to attend to the needs of an AIDS
child, particularly in an emergency situation.25 6 Yet, all available
evidence suggests that since the virus cannot be casually transmitted, 2 7
disclosure is neither medically necessary nor helpful. Furthermore,
routine procedures for attending bites and bleeding injuries are the
same in all situations, regardless of the presence of an AIDS victim
in the classroom. 258
Hence, in assessing these factors, the child's right of confidentiality
clearly prevails over the competing public need for disclosure. Such
disclosure would greatly harm the child as well as! ongoing reporting
and research efforts.
Disclosure limited solely to school health personnel, however, could
pass constitutional muster. Although danger of breach of confiden-
tiality still exists, it is reduced by restricting disclosure to health
officials within the school system who not only have experience in
maintaining sensitive confidential information259 but also have pledged
to do so.260 In addition, school medical personnel have an important
statutory reporting requirements that "advanced a need to acquire the information
to develop treatment programs or control threats to public health" are usually
constitutionally permissible. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
255. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
256. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 9, at 48-50.
257. See supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
258.
Because other infections in addition to HTLV-II1/LAV can be present
in blood or body fluids, all schools and day-care facilities, regardless of
whether children with HTLV-II1/LAV infection are attending, should
adopt routine procedures for handling blood or body fluids. Soiled
surfaces should be promptly cleaned with disinfectants .... Disposable
towels or tissues should be used whenever possible ... those who are
cleaning should avoid exposure to open skin lesions or mucous membranes
to the blood or body fluid.
Education and Foster Care of Children, supra note 210, at 108. Even states
allowing disclosure to school personnel are in agreement: "Routine & standard
procedures should be used to clean up after a child has an accident or injury at
school. Blood or other body fluids emanating from any child, including ones known
to have AIDS/ARC should be treated cautiously." CONNECTICUT GUIDELINES, supra
note 220, at 3 (emphasis in original); TExAs GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at 3.
259. Unlike school teachers and administrators, a medical professional invariably
has knowledge and access to confidential information concerning patients. Cf. In
re Donald Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983) (patient may permit access of
confidential information to nurse without waiving privilege of confidentiality). See
generally C. McFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS 365-81 (1961) (discussion of professional
secrecy in medical professions).
260. See supra note 227.
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function as liaison with the child's physician, family, and the school.2 '
Knowing the special needs of an AIDS-infected child, they can ad-
minister proper care in a professional manner and alert appropriate
medical authorities when necessary. 62 Hence, the reduced risk of public
disclosure, coupled with a legitimate policy objective, outweighs the
child's privacy interest in absolute confidentiality.
V. Recommendations
The difficulty in establishing the scope of constitutionally protected
informational privacy results from the lack of direction provided by
the Supreme Court in this area.2 63 Borrowing the key tenets of the
tort definition for public disclosure of private facts, 264 however, can
be instructive in formulating a framework to determine a consti-
tutionally protected privacy interest. Accordingly, this Note pro-
poses a similar test for determining whether a constitutionally protected
informational privacy interest is implicated: (1) the disclosure must
consist of private facts and not public ones; and (2) the disclosure
must be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person
of ordinary sensibility. 265 The first requirement is in accord with
Paul and would exclude personal matters available on public record.
The second requirement limits constitutional protection to matters
of sufficient severity and import. By applying this standard, courts
can reach objective and more consistent results in interpreting the
constitutional right of informational privacy.
Hence, under this test, the disclosure of the fact that an individual
has contracted AIDS implicates a constitutionally protected privacy
interest only if both elements of the test are met.2  Clearly this
261. "The school nurse should function as (a) the liaison with the child's physician,(b) the AIDS/ARC child's advocate in the school (i.e. assist in problem resolution,
answer questions) and (c) the coordinator of services provided by other staff."
CONNECTICUT GUIDELINES, supra note 220, at 1; TEXAS GUIDELINES, supra note
220, at 2.
262. See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
264. Prosser lists the elements for the tort of public disclosure of private facts:
"(I) the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure and not a private
one; (2) the facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and not public
ones; and (3) the matter made public must be one which would be highly offensive
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." W. PROSSER
& P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 856-57 (5th ed. 1984).
265. See id. Since governmental collection and storage of personal information
alone can infringe upon an individual's right to privacy even without public disclosure,
the first element of the tort definition does not apply to a constitutional definition
of informational privacy. See supra notes 21, 264 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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disclosure meets both requirements. First, it is a private fact, hidden
from the general public until the final fatal stages of the disease.6 7
Moreover, at that point, the victims are usually too ill to lead a
normal public life.268 Since the child would no longer be able to
attend classes, the fact that he had AIDS would not necessarily be
discovered. Second, as many AIDS victims are stigmatized and
socially isolated,269 the disclosure of their identities would be highly
267. The time between actual infection and development of symptoms can be
more that five years. See MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 2. However, most
infants who contract the virus in utero develop symptoms immediately. See supra
note 215 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that AIDS
affects its victims differently. See Kleiman, Doctors Consider Fears Focused on
AIDS Pupil, N.Y. Times, Sept. II, 1985, at B3, col. I.
Symptoms include exhaustion, fever, weight loss, swollen glands, discolored growths
on the skin or mucous membrane, diarrhea, unexplained bleeding, and progressive
shortness of breath. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 222, at 9. Symptoms of pediatric
AIDS victims usually range from recurrent, unexplained fevers and diarrhea to
pneumocystis, a serious lung infection common to AIDS victims in its final stages.
See Kleiman, Doctors Consider Fears Focused on AIDS Pupil, N.Y. Times, Sept.
11, 1985, at B3, col. 1. In addition, infants born infected with AIDS usually
manifest facial malformations such as box-like foreheads, abnormally flat nasal
bridges, oblique, wide-spaced eyes, flat noses, and unusually full lips and head
circumferences. See AIDS Infants Malformed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1986, at C5,
col. 1. Many also failed to grow. See id. For a detailed discussion describing the
symptoms of AIDS, see MEDICAL ANSWERS, supra note 1, at 15-17.
268. See supra note 215. Children with AIDS may suffer from a range of viral,
fungal, and parasitic diseases. See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-
United States, 34 Monnmrry & MORTALITY REP. 245 (1985), reprinted in REPORTS
ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 90. Most contact pneumocystis carninii, but very few
suffer from Kapsosi's Sarcoma. See id; FACTS ABOUT PEDIATRIC AIDS (Sept. 1985)
(available in AIDS packet compiled by the CDC).
269. The frightening symptoms and assured fatality of the AIDS disease has
created unprecedented anxiety among the general populace. Fearful of transmission,
Americans are altering their habits to avoid contact with potential AIDS transmitters.
This fear has at times reached the absurd: in New York City a subway seat painted
with the message "Did an AIDS patient sit here last?" remained empty despite
crowded rush-hour conditions. See Rimer, Fear of AIDS Grows Among Hetero-
sexuals, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 2; id., at B2, col. 5. In California,
political candidates are advocating: (1) mandatory testing of all Americans to detect
HTLV-1ll carriers; and (2) quarantining all persons exposed to the AIDS virus.
See Cummings, LaRouche Backer's Bid for House Spurs Dismay in California,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at 26, col. 1. In fact, the quarantine proposal is on
the November, 1986 ballot. See Kirp, LaRouche Turns To AIDS Politics, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at A27, col. 1.
In addition, a recent poll indicates that as a result of the AIDS epidemic, 37%
of American adults are less favorably disposed toward homosexuals. See 37% in
Poll Say AIDS Altered Their Attitude to Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985,
at 41, col. 1. Another poll reported that as a result of AIDS, most Americans
favor some sort of legal discrimination against homosexuals. See Shipp, Physical
Suffering Is Not the Only Pain That AIDS Can Inflict, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1986, at A8, col. 1. For instance, 51% of those polled favored quarantines for
people with AIDS and 45% favored screening all new employees for AIDS. See
19861
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIV
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibility.270 Therefore, since both elements are met, this personal
information is constitutionally protected.
VI. Conclusion
Subject to a multitude of physical ailments, AIDS victims also
suffer from social isolation and ostracism. Although the physical
effects of AIDS are frightening and uncontrollable, the negative
social effects need not be. Since all persons, including children, have
a constitutional right to informational privacy, the Constitution pro-
tects AIDS children who wish to keep their identities secret. Any
statute authorizing the collection or dissemination of their names
must be carefully scrutinized and balanced against the state's interest
in this information. While the state as the guardian of public welfare
has a strong interest in gathering all available medical data concerning
AIDS, its need to disclose this information to the public is much
weaker.
In the school setting, the state has a substantial interest in disclosing
the identities of children infected with AIDS to school medical
personnel. Such a disclosure requirement would advance public policy
in ensuring the health and welfare of both healthy and AIDS-afflicted
children at a minimal risk of widespread public disclosure. These
state interests outweigh the privacy interests of the AIDS-afflicted
children and, therefore, a statute requiring such disclosure would
be constitutionally permissible. The state interest in disclosure to
school administrators and teachers, however, would not effectively
id. at A8, col. 2. State and city commissions on human rights have received a
sharp increase in the number of complaints of discrimination based on AIDS and
sexual orientation. See id. at A8, cols. 1-5; see, e.g., McQuiston, City Finds Rise
in Complaints of Bias Against Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1986, at C7,
col. I (as a result of AIDS, complaints of violence and discrimination against
homosexuals more than doubled in past year in New York City); see also supra
notes 218-20 and accompanying text (adverse public reaction as a result of decision
to admit AIDS victims to schools).
Even the federal government has shown a half-hearted commitment to fight
discrimination against AIDS victims. In June, 1986, the Justice Department an-
nounced that if employers fear contagion of AIDS, they may discriminate against
employees infected with AIDS. See Pear, Rights Laws Offer Only Limited Help
on AIDS, U.S. Rules, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1986, at Al, col. 2; see also Pear,
A.M.A. Assails Decision of Justice Dept. on AIDS, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1986,
at 15, col. 5. But see Pear, States' AIDS Discrimination Laws Reject Justice
Department's Stand, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20, col. I (majority of states
have rejected Justice Department's AIDS policy).
270. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
1986] PRIVACY AND AIDS CHILDREN 969
advance the state interests and would greatly increase the risk of
widespread disclosure. In this case children's constitutional right to
safeguard their identities outweighs that of the public's right to
know.
Gretta J. Heaney

